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Abstract:  
Purpose: This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with 
competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. We examine firms’ optimal contract 
negotiation strategies in buyer-supplier-supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the 
retailer and two competing manufacturers.  
Design/methodology/approach: We consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which, the retailer has the 
option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or 
share production-cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, we derive the manufacturers’ 
optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal 
strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of 
equilibriums of eight possible scenarios 
Findings: We find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ 
decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their 
production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency 
manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order 
to gain more profit.  
Originality/value: Our modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by 
offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy 
and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial 
insights derived from our research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better 
strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness. 
 
Keywords: Negotiation policy; Asymmetric information; Buyer-supplier-supplier triads; Game theory 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past few decades there has been a growing body of research on negotiation strategy and the effects 
of symmetric and asymmetric information in supply chain management (Dwyer and Walker, 1981; Feng and 
Lu, 2013; Gurnani and Shi, 2006; Mishra and Prasad, 2005). The stream of research on supply chain contract 
negotiation strategy has demonstrated that negotiation power enables stronger firms to compel other firms to 
accept their terms of trade and even win concessions (Emerson, 1962; Crook and Combs, 2007; El Ouardighi 
and Kogan 2013; Maglaras et al. 2015). Although scholars have recognised for some time that exchange 
relationships are often characterised by an unequal access to information and power distribution between the 
parties (Dwyer, 1984; Shang et al., 2016, Luo et a. 2017), our understanding of negotiation under asymmetric 
information conditions remains limited. Indeed, in spite of the growing recognition of the importance of 
negotiation power and access to information in supply chain interactions (Frazier et al., 2009; Li et al. 2019), 
scholars have failed to offer a comprehensive model to explain negotiation strategy with competing partners 
under asymmetric production-cost information.  
    Our study seeks to fill this gap in our understanding by examining firms’ optimal contract negotiation 
strategies in buyer-supplier-supplier triads. We explore the issue in the context of a retailer and 
manufacturers’ interactions where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing 
manufacturers. Under this setting, the retailer is the dominant player in the supply chain, which becomes 
more and more common. The Stackelberg games are widely used to model the supply chain and bestow 
unequal negotiation powers on players (Kim and Kwak 2007; Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008; Feng and Lu, 
2013; Xiao et al. 2015). The retailer, as the Stackelberg leader, has two normal negotiation policies which are 
used to negotiate wholesale prices with the manufacturers: segmented negotiation policy and unified 
negotiation policy. In a segmented negotiation policy, the retailer negotiates with manufacturers separately 
on the basis of their production costs and the two manufacturers set different wholesale prices to the retailer. 
In a unified negotiation policy, the retailer negotiates with both manufacturers simultaneously according to 
their production costs and the two manufacturers set a single wholesale price to the retailer.  
     Furthermore, manufacturers have private information regarding their own production-cost. They can 
choose to withhold or share their production-cost information with the retailer in the contract negotiation.  
From the manufacturers’ perspective, withholding the production-cost information may enable them to gain 
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higher profit margin in the negotiation of wholesale prices with the retailer. In contrast, sharing 
production-cost information with the retailer will help manufacturers to secure wholesale prices that protect 
profit gain but with lower margins. In addition, a presence of a competing manufacturer brings further 
complexity to the problem. To help firms make the optimal strategic and operational decisions in the contract 
negotiations in the context of buyer-supplier-supplier triads, it is essential to have a comprehensive 
understanding of how the retailer’s negotiation policy (segmented negotiation policy vs. unified negotiation 
policy) and the manufacturers’ production-cost information strategy (withholding vs. sharing) affect their 
financial performances.   
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present a comprehensive overview 
of the literature on negotiation strategy and asymmetric information. This is then followed by Section 3 
which explicates the contours of our proposed unified model and assumptions and derives the manufacturers’ 
optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices. Based on these results, the penultimate 
section discusses the choice of retailer’s negotiation policies and the choices of the manufacturers’ 
production-cost information-sharing strategies in Section 4. The section also highlights the effect of 
manufacturers’ production efficiency on their decisions and performance. The final section concludes by 
outlining the research contributions, managerial implications, and a number of promising avenues for future 
research.  
 
 
2. Literature Review  
Our study is mainly related to two streams of the literature: (1) supply chain contract negotiation, and (2) 
power in supply chain contract negotiation. Now we discuss how our research relates to these two streams of 
the literature. 
2.1 Supply chain contract negotiation  
One of the distinctive features of supply chains is the contract negotiation that occurs between manufacturers 
and retailers (Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003). Negotiation behaviour entails haggling over the terms and 
conditions by channel members (Dwyer, 1984). This is a kind of “give and take” interaction shaped by the 
quality of information held by each party (Dwyer, 1984; Feng et al., 2015; Fu et al. 2017). Since many 
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critical components are negotiated between supply chain parties, it is important to understand the 
impact of negotiation strategy on collaborative intentions in buyer–supplier relationships (Thomas 
et al. 2013). Thomas et al. (2018) argued that supply chain firms should select their negotiation strategy 
carefully as the decision on negotiation strategy can have long-term effects on the overall relationship 
between them extending beyond the single negotiation encounter. 
   Many factors need to be considered in the supply chain contract negotiation. Interestingly, a 
well-developed line of research suggests that the negotiation processes and eventual agreement between 
supply chain members are shaped by factors such as quality of information, level of expertise and ability to 
bargain for favourable deals (Dwyer and Walker, 1981). Shang and Wang (2015) stated that risk aversion and 
negotiation power have a profound effect on the selection of optimal parameters in the profit-sharing contract 
negotiation. Chen et al. (2019) found that along with the external market characteristics and internal 
operational capabilities, negotiation power plays a significant role in the supply contract negotiation with a 
supplier, who is also its market rival. 
2.2 Power in supply chain negotiation  
Negotiation power can be defined as the channel member’s ability to favourably alter his or her negotiating 
position to win concessions from the other parties involved in a negotiation and thereby, change the outcome 
of a negotiation (Yan and Gray, 1994). Negotiation is an essential element in a firm’s ability to minimise the 
possibility of conflict in channel interactions (see Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004). Prior to negotiation, some 
channel members are more likely to hold better information about production costs, packaging and design, 
which may influence and shape their negotiation position. Under conditions of unequal power and unequal 
access to information, a powerful party in a negotiation is more likely to dictate the terms and win 
concessions (Dwyer and Walker, 1981). This line of research has suggested that the availability of 
alternatives not only influences the negotiation power of the channel members, but also how the power is 
utilised in the negotiation (Bacharach and Lawler, 1984). 
     One strand of related literature contends that a negotiation partner with more alternatives is more likely 
to be powerful due to his or her ability and willingness to threaten and walk away from a deal (Yan and Gray, 
1994; Fisher and Ury, 1981). This position enhances the channel members’ negotiation power and thereby 
squeezes better deals from the negotiating partner. In an unbalanced power structure with a retailer and two 
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competing manufacturers, each manufacturer may be forced to come to a deal quickly to mitigate the 
chances of losing to the rival. In an attempt to enhance his or her negotiation position, mitigate the risk of 
opportunism and protect sensitive information, some channel members may opt against sharing cost 
information with other partners (Frazier et al., 2009). Therefore, such negotiations are characterised by both 
information withholding and information sharing between channel partners.  
Another relevant stream of research is the power dependence perspective (Emerson, 1962). The theory 
notes that “the power of A over B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B upon A” (Emerson, 1962). 
This theory contends that access to critical information (information power) about a product or cost by a 
party reduces his or her dependence on others (Emerson, 1962; Hickson et al., 1971). The information power 
strengthens his or her position in business negotiations. Scholars have long recognised negotiation as one of 
the effective strategies that channel members can employ to deal with other members' power (Dwyer and 
Walker, 1981). Firms with weak market power may form a coalition to counterbalance the clout and effect of 
a dominant channel member (Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008). Another related line of research has suggested 
that a less powerful party may also seek additional information to counterbalance or strengthen his or her 
negotiating position (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Dwyer and Walker, 1981).  
A growing number of studies have looked at the impact of the supply chain power structure on firms’ 
decisions and performances covering various topics such as channel selection in the mobile phone supply 
chain (Chen and Wang 2015), pricing and effort decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (Gao et al. 2016) 
supply chain coordination for environmental improvement (Chen et al. 2017), and retail supply chain product 
choice and pricing decisions (Luo et al. 2018). These studies show that different power structures have 
significant impact on the firms’ strategic and operational decisions as well as firms’ individual and collective 
profits.  
2.3 Contribution to the literature  
In this paper, we examine this important but largely unexplored issue of a retailer’s negotiation strategy and 
two competing manufacturers’ production-cost information strategy in the wholesale contract negotiation 
under the setting of buyer-supplier-supplier triads. Our study makes two main contributions to the literature. 
First, despite the accumulating body of literature on supply chain negotiation and the seeming importance of 
the issue (Crook and Combs, 2007), past studies have largely failed to identify manufacturers’ optimal 
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strategy in supply chain wholesales contract negotiation, where there is a retailer and two competing 
manufacturers. Based on game theory, we derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the 
retailer’s optimal retailer prices. In addition, we also shed light on the retailer’s optimal negotiation strategy 
under different production-cost information strategies adopted by manufacturers. Second, in spite of a 
growing body of literature on negotiation power in supply chains (Dwyer and Walker, 1981; Crook and 
Combs, 2007; Sheu and Gao 2014) and information asymmetry (Xu et al., 2010; Boeh, 2011; Li and Li 2016; 
Tong and Crosno 2016), there has been little attempt to integrate these streams of research. Consequently, 
our understanding of retailer’s negotiation strategy under asymmetric production-cost information is limited. 
This study fills this void in our understanding by integrating a retailer’s negotiation strategy and 
manufacturers’ production-cost information strategy to develop a new perspective on supply chain decisions.  
 
3. The models and equilibrium analysis 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain that is composed of two competitive manufacturers and a common 
retailer. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual approach to the issue. The retailer is assumed as the Stackelberg 
leader and the two manufacturers are assumed as Stackelberg followers. 
 
The manufacturers produce a substitutable product with different production efficiencies. Without loss 
of generalisability, we assume that the relationship between manufacturer 𝑖’s unit production cost, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 =
1,2), is 𝑐1 < 𝑐2, that is, manufacturer 1 has higher production efficiency as compared to manufacturer 2. The 
retailer orders products from the manufacturers and then sells them to end customers. If the manufacturers 
withhold their production-cost information, the retailer will negotiate with manufacturers on the basis of 
Manufacturer 1 
Manufacturer 2 
Competing firms Retailer 
𝑞𝑥1 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑥1 + 𝛾𝑝𝑥2 
𝑞𝑥2 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑥2 + 𝛾𝑝𝑥1 
Figure 1 Two-echelon supply chain with two manufacturers and a retailer 
Options – production cost 
⚫ Information withholding 
⚫ Information sharing 
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industry-average production cost, that is 
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
. According to the manufacturers’ information-sharing 
strategies (withholding or sharing production-cost information strategy) and the retailer’s negotiation 
strategy (segmented or unified negotiation policy), there are eight possible scenarios (𝑥=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 
as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Scenario of retailer’s negotiation policies and manufacturers’ information sharing strategy 
𝒙 Description 
1 Segmented negotiation and both manufacturers sharing their cost information. 
2 Unified negotiation and both manufacturers sharing their cost information. 
3 Segmented negotiation and both manufacturers withholding their cost information. 
4 Unified negotiation and both manufacturers withholding their cost information. 
5 Segmented negotiation and only manufacturer 1 sharing his cost information. 
6 Unified negotiation and only manufacturer 1 sharing his cost information. 
7 Segmented negotiation and only manufacturer 2 sharing his cost information. 
8 Unified negotiation and only manufacturer 2 sharing his cost information. 
    
    For the retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥 , manufacturer 𝑖 ’s wholesale price is 𝑤𝑥𝑖 , the retailer’s 
corresponding retail price is 𝑝𝑥𝑖, and the demand for product 𝑖 is 𝑞𝑥𝑖. Similar to the conventional demand 
function (Choi, 1991; Chen and Wang, 2017; Chen et al., 2016), the demand function is defined as 𝑞𝑥𝑖 =
𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑥𝑗 (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), where 𝛼 represents the potential market scale of product, 𝛽 means 
the self-price sensitivity and 𝛾  means the cross-price sensitivity. 𝛽 > 𝛾  indicates that the self-price 
sensitivity is higher than the cross-price sensitivity. We assume that the retailer’s marginal profit of product 𝑖 
is 𝑚𝑥𝑖, that is, 𝑚𝑥𝑖 = 𝑝𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤𝑥𝑖. 
If manufacturer 1 shares his production cost, the actual cost 𝑐1 is used in the negotiation, then 
manufacturer 1’s profit with retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥, denoted as 𝜋𝑥1
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥1), is: 
𝜋𝑥1
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥1) = (𝑤𝑥1 − 𝑐1)[𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚𝑥1 + 𝑤𝑥1) + 𝛾(𝑚𝑥2 + 𝑤𝑥2)] (1) 
The first term is manufacturer 1’s unit product profit, and the second term is the retailer’s order quantity. 
Similarly, if manufacturer 2 shares his production cost, the actual cost 𝑐2 is used in the negotiation, 
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then manufacturer 2’s profit with retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥, denoted as 𝜋𝑥2
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥2), is: 
𝜋𝑥2
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥2) = (𝑤𝑥2 − 𝑐2)[𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚𝑥2 + 𝑤𝑥2) + 𝛾(𝑚𝑥1 + 𝑤𝑥1)] (2) 
The first term is manufacturer 2’s unit product profit and the second term is the retailer’s order quantity. 
    If manufacturer 1 withholds his production cost, the industry average cost 
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
 is used in the 
negotiation, then manufacturer 1’s profit with retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥, denoted as ?̅?𝑥1
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥1), is: 
?̅?𝑥1
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥1) = (𝑤𝑥1 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚𝑥1 + 𝑤𝑥1) + 𝛾(𝑚𝑥2 + 𝑤𝑥2)] (3) 
Similarly, if manufacturer 2 withholds his profit, the industry average cost 
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
 is used in the 
negotiation, then manufacturer 2’s profit with retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥, denoted as ?̅?𝑥2
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥2), is: 
?̅?𝑥2
𝑚 (𝑤𝑥2) = (𝑤𝑥2 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚𝑥2 + 𝑤𝑥2) + 𝛾(𝑚𝑥1 + 𝑤𝑥1)] (4) 
The retailer’s profit with retailer’s negotiation strategy 𝑥, denoted as 𝜋𝑥
𝑟(𝑝𝑥1, 𝑝𝑥2), is: 
𝜋𝑥
𝑟(𝑝𝑥1, 𝑝𝑥2) = (𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑤𝑥1)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑥1 + 𝛾𝑝𝑥2) + (𝑝𝑥2 − 𝑤𝑥2)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑥2 + 𝛾𝑝𝑥1) (5) 
The first term is the retailer’s profit from product 1 and the second term is the retailer’s profit from 
product 2. 
    With retailer’s different negotiation strategies, the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the 
retailer’s optimal retail prices are derived as Table 2. The derivation of these optimal solutions is provided in 
the Appendix
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Table 2A. Optimal wholesale prices for possible negotiation scenarios 
Negotiation scenarios 𝒘𝒙𝟏
∗  𝒘𝒙𝟐
∗  
Scenario 1 
𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (6𝛽2 − 𝛾2)𝑐1 + 𝛽𝛾𝑐2
2(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (6𝛽2 − 𝛾2)𝑐2 + 𝛽𝛾𝑐1
2(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 2 
3(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8
+
𝛼
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 3 
2𝛼 + (3𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8𝛽 − 4𝛾
 
2𝛼 + (3𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8𝛽 − 4𝛾
 
Scenario 4 
2𝛼 + 3(𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 5 
2𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + 𝛽𝛾𝑐2 + (12𝛽
2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 2𝛾2)𝑐1
16𝛽2 − 4𝛾2
 
2𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (6𝛽2 − 𝛾2)𝑐2 + (6𝛽
2 + 2𝛽𝛾 − 𝛾2)𝑐1
16𝛽2 − 4𝛾2
 
Scenario 6 
4𝛼 + 3(3𝑐1 + 𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
16(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 7 
2𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (6𝛽2 − 𝛾2)𝑐1 + (6𝛽
2 + 2𝛽𝛾 − 𝛾2)𝑐2
16𝛽2 − 4𝛾2
 
2𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (12𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 2𝛾2)𝑐2 + 𝛽𝛾𝑐1
16𝛽2 − 4𝛾2
 
Scenario 8 
4𝛼 + 3(3𝑐1 + 𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
16(𝛽 − 𝛾)
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Table 2B. Optimal retail prices for possible negotiation scenarios 
Negotiation scenarios 𝒑𝒙𝟏
∗  𝒑𝒙𝟐
∗  
Scenario 1 
𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + 2𝛽2(𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 + 𝛽𝛾(𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐2
2(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + 2𝛽2(𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐2 + 𝛽𝛾(𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1
2(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 2 
3𝛼
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)
𝛽 + 𝛾
+
5𝑐2 − 3𝑐1
8
 
3𝛼
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)
𝛽 + 𝛾
+
5𝑐1 − 3𝑐2
8
 
Scenario 3 
2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + 𝛽(𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
4(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + 𝛽(𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
4(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 4 
6𝛼 + (𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
6𝛼 + (𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)
8(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 5 
2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2)𝑐2 + (4𝛽
3 − 3𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
 
𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽3 − 𝛽2𝛾)𝑐2 + (𝛽
3 − 𝛽2𝛾 + 𝛾)𝑐1
2(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
 
Scenario 6 
12𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽 − 𝛾)[𝛽(7𝑐1 − 3𝑐2) − 𝛾(𝑐1 − 5𝑐2)]
16(𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
12𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) − (𝛽 − 𝛾)[𝛽(𝑐1 − 5𝑐2) − 𝛾(7𝑐1 − 3𝑐2)]
16(𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
Scenario 7 
𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽3 − 𝛽2𝛾)𝑐1 + (𝛽
3 − 𝛽𝛾2)𝑐2
2(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
 
2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1 + (4𝛽
3 − 3𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
 
Scenario 8 
12𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) + (𝛽 − 𝛾)[𝛽(5𝑐1 − 𝑐2) − 𝛾(3𝑐1 − 7𝑐2)]
16(𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
12𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾) − (𝛽 − 𝛾)[𝛽(3𝑐1 − 7𝑐2) − 𝛾(5𝑐1 − 𝑐2)]
16(𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
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4 Firms’ strategic choices   
In this section, we discuss the effect of production efficiency, the choice of retailer’s negotiation strategy and 
the choices of manufacturers’ information-sharing strategies on the supply chain performance. 
4.1 The choice of retailer’s negotiation strategy 
From the retailer’s perspective, we discuss the choice of negotiation strategy under manufacturers’ different 
production-cost information-sharing strategies and deduce the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will 
adopt a unified negotiation policy; otherwise, the retailer will adopt a segmented negotiation policy. 
    This proposition indicates that manufacturers’ decision on whether to share their production cost 
information has a significant impact on the retailer’s optimal decision on negotiation policy. A unified 
negotiation policy should be adopted only when the retailer has the production-cost information of both 
manufacturers. To maximize the profit, the retailer should choose the optimal negotiation strategy according 
to the manufacturers’ production-cost information-sharing strategy.  
   In terms of the relationship between the retailer’s maximum profits from the adopted negotiation strategy 
under the manufacturers’ different production-cost information strategies, the following proposition is 
obtained: 
Proposition 2: 𝝅𝟐
𝒓(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ , 𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟓
𝒓(𝒑𝟓𝟏
∗ , 𝒑𝟓𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟑
𝒓(𝒑𝟑𝟏
∗ , 𝒑𝟑𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟕
𝒓(𝒑𝟕𝟏
∗ , 𝒑𝟕𝟐
∗ ). 
From this proposition, we know that when the low-efficiency manufacturer (manufacturer 2) shares his 
production-cost information strategy, the retailer gains less profit than that with both manufacturers 
withholding their production-cost information strategy. On the contrary, when the high-efficiency 
manufacturer (manufacturer 1) shares his production-cost information strategy, the retailer gains more profit 
than that with both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy. Specifically, 
compared with both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy, one manufacturer 
sharing his production-cost information will not always benefit the retailer. The retailer will ignore 
manufacturer 2’s actual production-cost information and will negotiate with the manufacturers according to 
the industry average production cost. From the retailer’s perspective, only the scenario of the low-efficiency 
manufacturer sharing his production-cost information will not be taken into consideration. The ordering 
between the retailer’s maximum profits follows that 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) > 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) > 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ). The 
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above relationship means that the retailer’s maximum profit with both manufacturers sharing their 
production-cost information strategy is higher than that with only the high-efficiency manufacturer sharing 
his production-cost information strategy, and the retailer’s maximum profit with only the high-efficiency 
manufacturer sharing his production-cost information strategy is in turn higher than that with both 
manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy. Therefore, the above analysis further 
demonstrates that the manufacturer’s production-cost information-sharing strategy plays an important role in 
the retailer’s maximum profit, supporting the view of Dwyer and Walker (1981) that the negotiation 
processes and eventual agreement between supply chain members are shaped by factors including quality of 
information and ability to bargain for favourable deals. 
4.2 The choice of the manufacturers’ production-cost information-sharing strategy 
In this section, we discuss the choice of two competing manufacturers’ production-cost information-sharing 
strategies on the basis of retailer’s different negotiation policies. In terms of the relationship between 
manufacturer 1’s maximum profits and the retailer’s negotiation policies, the following proposition is 
obtained: 
Proposition 3: 𝝅𝟐𝟏
𝒎 (𝒘𝟐𝟏
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟑𝟏
𝒎 (𝒘𝟑𝟏
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟓𝟏
𝒎 (𝒘𝟓𝟏
∗ ). 
This proposition means that the maximum profit of the high-efficiency manufacturer (manufacturer 1) 
with both manufacturers sharing their production-cost information strategy is higher than that with both 
manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy, and the high-efficiency manufacturer’s 
maximum profit with both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy is in turn 
higher than that with only manufacturer 1 sharing his production-cost information strategy.  
More specifically, the high-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum profit is affected by both the 
manufacturers’ production-cost-sharing strategies. Compared with both manufacturers withholding their 
production-cost information strategy, only one manufacturer sharing his production-cost information strategy 
will not benefit the high-efficiency manufacturer. The high-efficiency manufacturer will adopt the same 
production-cost information-sharing strategy as that adopted by the low-efficiency manufacturer 
(manufacturer 2). In addition, from propositions 2 and 3, we know that both manufacturers sharing their 
production-cost information strategy will benefit both the retailer and the high-efficiency manufacturer. 
    In terms of the relationship between manufacturer 2’s maximum profit with both manufacturers sharing 
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their production-cost information and with both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information, 
the following proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 4:  
(1) If 𝜸 < 𝜷 < 𝟐𝜸, or 𝜷 > 𝟐𝜸 and 𝜶 > 𝜶𝟏 or 𝜶 < 𝜶𝟐, then 𝝅𝟐𝟐
𝒎 (𝒘𝟐𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝟑𝟐
𝒎 (𝒘𝟑𝟐
∗ ); if 𝜷 > 𝟐𝜸 
and 𝜶𝟐 < 𝜶 < 𝜶𝟏, then 𝝅𝟐𝟐
𝒎 (𝒘𝟐𝟐
∗ ) < 𝝅𝟑𝟐
𝒎 (𝒘𝟑𝟐
∗ ), where 𝜶𝟏 =
(𝜷−𝜸)[(𝟖𝜷𝟐−𝟏𝟐𝜷𝜸+𝟓𝜸𝟐)𝒄𝟐−(𝟖𝜷
𝟐−𝟏𝟐𝜷𝜸+𝟑𝜸𝟐)𝒄𝟏]
𝟐𝜸𝟐
+
𝟒(𝒄𝟐−𝒄𝟏)(𝟐𝜷−𝜸)(𝜷−𝜸)√𝜷(𝜷−𝟐𝜸)
𝟐𝜸𝟐
, 𝜶𝟐 =
(𝜷−𝜸)[(𝟖𝜷𝟐−𝟏𝟐𝜷𝜸+𝟓𝜸𝟐)𝒄𝟐−(𝟖𝜷
𝟐−𝟏𝟐𝜷𝜸+𝟑𝜸𝟐)𝒄𝟏]
𝟐𝜸𝟐
−
𝟒(𝒄𝟐−𝒄𝟏)(𝟐𝜷−𝜸)(𝜷−𝜸)√𝜷(𝜷−𝟐𝜸)
𝟐𝜸𝟐
. 
(2) If 𝜷 > 𝟐𝜸, then ∆𝜶 increases in 𝜷 and decreases in 𝜸, where ∆𝜶 = 𝜶𝟏 − 𝜶𝟐. 
This proposition means that the low-efficiency manufacturer’s (manufacturer 2) production-cost 
information-sharing strategy is decided by the potential market scale of the product (𝛼), self-price sensitivity 
(𝛽) and cross-price sensitivity (𝛾). If the manufacturers’ self-price sensitivity is low (𝛾 < 𝛽 < 2𝛾), or the 
manufacturers’ self-price sensitivity is high and the potential market scale of product is to some extent large 
or some extent small (𝛽 > 2𝛾 and 𝛼 > 𝛼1 or 𝛼 < 𝛼2), then the low-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum 
profit with both manufacturers sharing their production-cost information strategy is higher than that with 
both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information strategy; both manufacturers will also 
share their production-cost information.  
   Otherwise, if the manufacturers’ self-price sensitivity is high and the potential market scale of product is 
medium size (𝛽 > 2𝛾 and 𝛼2 < 𝛼 < 𝛼1), then the low-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum profit with both 
manufacturers sharing their production-cost information strategy is lower than that with both manufacturers 
withholding their production-cost information strategy; both manufacturers will withhold their 
production-cost information. That is, compared to both manufacturers withholding their production-cost 
information strategy, manufacturers sharing their production-cost information will not always hurt the 
manufacturers. From the view of the low-efficiency manufacturer (manufacturer 2), if the potential market 
scale of product is to some extent large, he will prefer to share his production-cost information. 
Furthermore, when the manufacturers’ self-price sensitivity (𝛽) is high or cross-price sensitivity (𝛾) is 
low, then the scope of the potential market scale of product ( ∆𝛼 ) is large, so the low-efficiency 
manufacturer’s maximum profit with both manufacturers sharing their production-cost information strategy 
is more likely to be lower than that with both manufacturers withholding their production-cost information 
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strategy; both manufacturers will prefer to withhold their production-cost information. Our analysis results 
support the finding of Frazier et al. (2009) that some channel members may opt against sharing cost 
information with other partners in order to enhance their negotiation position and gain competitive 
advantages.  
4.3 The effect of production efficiency 
In terms of the effect of the manufacturers’ production efficiency on their maximum profit, the following 
proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 5: The high-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum profit is always higher than that of the 
low-efficiency manufacturer. 
This proposition means that no matter which negotiation strategy is adopted by the retailer, the 
high-efficiency manufacturer will always gain more profit than that of the low-efficiency manufacturer. 
Although whether to share or withhold production-cost information in the negotiation with the retailer has an 
effect on manufacturers’ financial performance, fundamentally, manufacturers should improve their 
production efficiency and reduce production costs in order to increase profit and gain competitive market 
advantage despite other options such as forming a coalition (Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008) or seeking 
alternative information strategy (Dwyer and Walker, 1981) in the supply chain contract negotiation. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study explores a retailer’s optimal negotiation policy and two competing manufacturers’ optimal 
production-cost information strategies in the setting of buyer-supplier-supplier triads where with the two 
manufacturers have asymmetric production-cost. In the contract negotiation between a retailer and two 
manufacturers, the retailer, as the Stackelberg leader, has the option of segmented or unified negotiation 
policy, whereas the manufacturers, as the Stackelberg followers, also have the option of withholding or 
sharing production-cost information strategy. From both the retailer and manufacturers’ perspective, we 
examine their optimal strategic choices and operational decisions respectively through the comparative 
analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios. Our study indicates that the choice of retailer’s 
negotiation policy, the manufacturers’ information-sharing decisions, and manufacturers’ production 
efficiency have significant effects on the financial performance of the retailer and the two rival 
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manufacturers.  
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, although some studies have examined 
negotiation in the supply chain (Crook and Combs, 2007; Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008), these studies have 
largely overlooked negotiation process under asymmetric production-cost information. This study 
complements to this stream of literature by modelling the relationship between a retailer and two 
manufacturers engaging in the negotiation process under asymmetric production-cost information. Whilst 
some studies have examined the negotiation process between a manufacturer and a retailer over the terms of 
trade (e.g. Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003), they have broadly overlooked the need to consider negotiation under 
asymmetric production-cost information and competing manufacturers. In this respect, our study addresses 
this void in the existing literature. Second, the study also responds to the call issued by Feng and Lu (2013) 
for more negotiation-based models to examine supply chain contracting. Our modelling and 
conceptualisation help to bring further clarity in the area by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our 
understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process 
form the perspectives of all engaging parties. 
    Our findings provide several important managerial implications which would enable retailers and 
manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve their performance. 
First, the analysis suggests that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies (either the unified 
negotiation policy or the segmented negotiation policy) depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or 
withholding their production-cost information. For instance, when both manufacturers share their 
production-cost information, the retailer will choose the unified negotiation policy. In this scenario, the 
retailer will gain more profit compared to any other scenarios modelled in this study. In contrast, the retailer 
will employ the segmented negotiation policy if both manufacturers decide to withhold their production-cost 
information. However, compared to the scenario mentioned above, the retailer will also get much less profit. 
The retailer’s performance in the scenarios that only one manufacturer shares production-cost information is 
more complicated than the scenarios that both manufacturers share or withhold information as discussed 
above. In a nutshell, in order to maximise profit, the retailer should not only employ the right negotiation 
policy according to the manufacturers’ cost information-sharing strategies, but also exercise his channel 
power to persuade manufacturers to share their production-cost information or at least disclose the 
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high-efficiency manufacturer’s production-cost information. These insights will be particularly beneficial for 
supermarkets that often negotiate supply contract with multiple suppliers.    
    Furthermore, as for the effect of the manufacturers’ production-cost information-sharing strategy on 
their financial performance, the high-efficiency manufacturer performs best when both manufacturers share 
production-cost information and his performance is worst if only one manufacturer shares his 
production-cost information. Therefore, the high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same 
information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit. For the 
low-efficiency manufacturer, to optimise his performance, the production-cost information-sharing strategy 
should be dependent on the potential market scale of product, self-price sensitivity and cross-price sensitivity 
as illustrated in Proposition 4. These insights will be useful to manufacturers in the supply chains like food, 
fashion or electronics, where there is often fierce market competition. Unsurprisingly, our model 
demonstrates that the high-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum profit is higher than that of the 
low-efficiency manufacturer. Although different negotiation and information-sharing strategies will impact 
individual supply chain partners’ performance, fundamentally, manufacturers should develop their own 
capabilities and improve production efficiency in order to gain competitive advantages over their 
competitors.   
    Our work suggests a number of fruitful avenues that can be pursued to further enrich our understanding 
of the subject. First, given that our study considered only the negotiation strategy under conditions of 
asymmetrical information, future research should seek to broaden our conceptualisation to include factors 
such as negotiating skills, relational capital and level of expertise which can influence the outcome of the 
negotiation process. Future study could also model a more balanced power setting with complete information 
about production-cost information between a retailer and competing manufacturers. Another avenue for 
future research would be to explore more scenarios, where there are more than two competing manufacturers 
in a balanced information and power structure. More broadly, it would be useful to examine the 
post-negotiation effects. A manufacturer who emerges from a negotiation as not the main beneficiary is less 
likely to cooperate with the retailer. The “winner-take-all” attitude is more likely to drive down the morale of 
channel partners. Therefore, there is a need to explore this issue further to advance our understanding of the 
post-negotiation effects. We hope this study serves as a catalyst for more studies on negotiation in the supply 
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chain. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of Table 2 
(1) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 1. From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11)
𝑑𝑤11
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤11 + 𝑚11) + 𝛾(𝑤12 + 𝑚12) −
𝛽(𝑤11 − 𝑐1) and 
𝑑2𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11)
𝑑𝑤11
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, then 𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11) is a concave function of 𝑤11. Let 
𝑑𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11)
𝑑𝑤11
= 0, we 
get 𝑤11
∗ =
1
𝛽
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝11 + 𝛾𝑝12 + 𝛽𝑐1). Similarly, from (2), we get 
𝑑𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12)
𝑑𝑤12
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤12 + 𝑚12) + 𝛾(𝑤11 +
𝑚11) − 𝛽(𝑤12 − 𝑐2) and 
𝑑2𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12)
𝑑𝑤12
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, then 𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12) is a concave function of 𝑤12. Let 
𝑑𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12)
𝑑𝑤12
=
0, we get 𝑤12
∗ =
1
𝛽
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝12 + 𝛾𝑝11 + 𝛽𝑐2). 
Replace 𝑤11
∗  and 𝑤12
∗  to (5), we get 
𝜕𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11
= 𝛽𝑐1 − 4𝛽𝑝11 − 𝛾𝑐2 + 6𝛾𝑝12 −
2𝛾2𝑝11
𝛽
+ 𝛼(3 −
2𝛾
𝛽
) , 
𝜕𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12
= 𝛽𝑐2 − 4𝛽𝑝12 − 𝛾𝑐1 + 6𝛾𝑝11 −
2𝛾2𝑝12
𝛽
+ 𝛼(3 −
2𝛾
𝛽
) , 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
< 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12
2 =
−4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
 and 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11𝜕𝑝12
=
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12𝜕𝑝11
= 6𝛾. Then |
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11
2
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11𝜕𝑝12
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12𝜕𝑝11
𝜕2𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12
2
| =
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)(𝛽2−𝛾2)
𝛽2
> 0. That 
is, 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11, 𝑝12) is a joint concave function of 𝑝11 and 𝑝12. From 
𝜕𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝11
=
𝜕𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11,𝑝12)
𝜕𝑝12
= 0, we get 𝑝11
∗ =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)(3𝛽−2𝛾)+2𝛽2(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1+𝛽𝛾(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐2
2(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
 and 𝑝12
∗ =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)(3𝛽−2𝛾)+2𝛽2(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐2+𝛽𝛾(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1
2(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝11
∗  and 𝑝12
∗  to 
𝑤11
∗  and 𝑤12
∗ , we get 𝑤11
∗ =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(6𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐1+𝛽𝛾𝑐2
2(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)
 and 𝑤12
∗ =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(6𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐2+𝛽𝛾𝑐1
2(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)
. 
    (2) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 2. From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤2 + 𝑚21) + 𝛾(𝑤2 + 𝑚22) − (𝛽 −
𝛾)(𝑤2 − 𝑐1) and 
𝑑2𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, that is, 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2) is a concave function of 𝑤2. Similarly, from (2), 
we get
𝑑𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤2 + 𝑚22) + 𝛾(𝑤2 + 𝑚21) + (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝑤2 − 𝑐2) and 
𝑑2𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤21)
𝑑𝑤22
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, that 
is, 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2) is a concave function of 𝑤2. From 
𝑑𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
=
𝑑𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
= 0, we get 𝑝22 =
(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛽+𝛾
+ 𝑝21.  
Replace 𝑤2
∗  and 𝑝22  to (5), we get 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21,𝑝22)
𝑑𝑝21
=
𝑑𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21)
𝑑𝑝21
=
6𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(5𝑐1−3𝑐2−8𝑝21)+𝛾(−3𝑐1+5𝑐2−8𝑝21)]
𝛽+𝛾
 and 
𝑑2𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21)
𝑑𝑝21
2 = −8(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0 , that is, 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21, 𝑝22)  is a 
concave function of 𝑝21. Let 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21,𝑝22)
𝑑𝑝21
= 0, we get 𝑝21
∗ =
3𝛼
4(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝛽(𝑐1−𝑐2)
𝛽+𝛾
+
5𝑐2−3𝑐1
8
. Replace 𝑝21
∗  to 𝑝22, we 
get 𝑝22
∗ =
3𝛼
4(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛽+𝛾
+
5𝑐1−3𝑐2
8
. Replace 𝑝21
∗  and 𝑝22
∗  to 𝑤2
∗, we get 𝑤2
∗ =
3(𝑐1+𝑐2)
8
+
𝛼
4(𝛽−𝛾)
.  
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    (3) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 3. From (3), we get 
𝑑?̅?31
𝑚 (𝑤31)
𝑑𝑤31
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚31 + 𝑤31) + 𝛾(𝑚32 + 𝑤32) −
𝛽 (𝑤31 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?31
𝑚 (𝑤31)
𝑑𝑤31
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, that is, ?̅?31
𝑚 (𝑤31) is a concave function of 𝑤31. Let 
𝑑?̅?31
𝑚 (𝑤31)
𝑑𝑤31
= 0, 
we get 𝑤31
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝31+𝛾𝑝32
𝛽
+
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
. Similarly, from (4), we get 
𝑑?̅?32
𝑚 (𝑤32)
𝑑𝑤32
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚32 + 𝑤32) + 𝛾(𝑚31 +
𝑤31) − 𝛽 (𝑤23 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
)  and 
𝑑2?̅?32
𝑚 (𝑤32)
𝑑𝑤32
2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , that is, ?̅?32
𝑚 (𝑤32)  is a concave function of 𝑤32 . Let 
𝑑?̅?32
𝑚 (𝑤32)
𝑑𝑤32
= 0, we get 𝑤32
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝32+𝛾𝑝31
𝛽
+
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
. 
Replace 𝑤31
∗  and 𝑤32
∗  to (5), we get 
𝜕𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31
= (𝛽 − 𝛾)
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
− 4𝛽𝑝31 + 6𝛾𝑝32 −
2𝛾2𝑝31
𝛽
+ 𝛼(3 −
2𝛾
𝛽
), 
𝜕𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32
= (𝛽 − 𝛾)
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
− 4𝛽𝑝32 + 6𝛾𝑝31 −
2𝛾2𝑝32
𝛽
+ 𝛼(3 −
2𝛾
𝛽
) , 
𝜕2?̅?3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
< 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
 and 
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31𝜕𝑝32
=
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32𝜕𝑝31
= 6𝛾 . Then |
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31
2
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31𝜕𝑝32
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32𝜕𝑝31
𝜕2𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32
2
| =
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)(𝛽2−𝛾2)
𝛽2
> 0. That is, 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31, 𝑝32) is a joint concave of 𝑝31 and 𝑝32. From 
𝜕𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝31
=
𝜕𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31,𝑝32)
𝜕𝑝32
=
0, we get 𝑝31
∗ = 𝑝32
∗ =
2𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)+𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)
4(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝31
∗  and 𝑝32
∗  to 𝑤31
∗  and 𝑤32
∗ , we get 𝑤31
∗ = 𝑤32
∗ =
2𝛼+(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)
8𝛽−4𝛾
.  
    (4) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 4. From (3), we get 
𝑑?̅?41
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚41 + 𝑤4) + 𝛾(𝑚42 + 𝑤4) − (𝛽 −
𝛾) (𝑤4 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?41
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, that is, ?̅?41
𝑚 (𝑤4) is a concave function of 𝑤4. Similarly, from 
(4), we get
𝑑?̅?42
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚42 + 𝑤4) + 𝛾(𝑚41 + 𝑤4) − (𝛽 − 𝛾) (𝑤4 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?42
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) <
0, that is, ?̅?42
𝑚 (𝑤4) is a concave function of 𝑤4. From 
𝑑?̅?41
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
=
𝑑?̅?42
𝑚 (𝑤4)
𝑑𝑤4
= 0, we get 𝑝41 = 𝑝42. Replace 𝑤4
∗ 
and 𝑝42 to (5), we get 
𝑑?̅?4
𝑟(𝑝41,𝑝42)
𝑑𝑝41
=
𝑑?̅?4
𝑟(𝑝41)
𝑑𝑝41
= 6𝛼 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐2 − 8𝑝41)(𝛽 − 𝛾) and 
𝑑2?̅?4
𝑟(𝑝41)
𝑑𝑝41
2 = −8(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, 
that is, ?̅?4
𝑟(𝑝41) is a concave function of 𝑝41. Let 
𝑑?̅?4
𝑟(𝑝41)
𝑑𝑝41
= 0, we get 𝑝41
∗ = 𝑝42
∗ =
6𝛼+(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)
8(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 
𝑝41
∗  and 𝑝42
∗  to (4.3-a), we get 𝑤4
∗ =
2𝛼+3(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)
8(𝛽−𝛾)
. 
    (5) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 5. From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51)
𝑑𝑤51
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚51 + 𝑤51) + 𝛾(𝑚52 + 𝑤52) −
𝛽(𝑤51 − 𝑐1) and 
𝑑2𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51)
𝑑𝑤51
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, that is, 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51) is a concave function of 𝑤51. Let 
𝑑𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51)
𝑑𝑤51
= 0, we 
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get 𝑤51
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝51+𝛾𝑝52
𝛽
+ 𝑐1 . Similarly, from (4), we get
𝑑?̅?52
𝑚 (𝑤52)
𝑑𝑤52
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚52 + 𝑤52) + 𝛾(𝑚51 + 𝑤51) −
𝛽 (𝑤52 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?52
𝑚 (𝑤52)
𝑑𝑤52
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, that is, ?̅?52
𝑚 (𝑤52) is a concave function of 𝑤52. Let 
𝑑?̅?52
𝑚 (𝑤52)
𝑑𝑤52
= 0, 
we get 𝑤52
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝52+𝛾𝑝51
𝛽
+
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
. 
Replace 𝑤51
∗  and 𝑤52
∗  to (5), we get that
𝜕𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51
=
1
2𝛽
[2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + (2𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛾)𝑐1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑐2 +
12𝛽𝛾𝑝52 − 4(2𝛽
2 + 𝛾2)𝑝51] , 
𝜕𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52
=
1
2𝛽
[2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) + (𝛽2 − 2𝛽𝛾)𝑐1 − 𝛽
2𝑐2 + 12𝛽𝛾𝑝51 − 4(2𝛽
2 +
𝛾2)𝑝52], 
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
< 0, 
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
 and 
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51𝜕𝑝52
=
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52𝜕𝑝51
= 6𝛾. Then 
|
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51
2
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51𝜕𝑝52
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52𝜕𝑝51
𝜕2𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52
2
| =
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)(𝛽2−𝛾2)
𝛽2
> 0. That is, 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51, 𝑝52) is a joint concave function of 𝑝51 and 
𝑝52 . From 
𝜕𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝51
=
𝜕𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51,𝑝52)
𝜕𝑝52
= 0 , we get 𝑝51
∗ =
2𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2)𝑐2+(4𝛽
3−3𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1
4(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)
 and 
𝑝52
∗ =
𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽3−𝛽2𝛾)𝑐2+(𝛽
3−𝛽2𝛾+𝛾)𝑐1
2(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝51
∗  and 𝑝52
∗  to 𝑤51
∗  and 𝑤52
∗ , we get 𝑤51
∗ =
2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+𝛽𝛾𝑐2+(12𝛽
2+𝛽𝛾−2𝛾2)𝑐1
16𝛽2−4𝛾2
 and 𝑤52
∗ =
2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(6𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐2+(6𝛽
2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐1
16𝛽2−4𝛾2
.  
    (6) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 6. From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚61 + 𝑤6) + 𝛾(𝑚62 + 𝑤6) − (𝛽 −
𝛾)(𝑤6 − 𝑐1) and 
𝑑2𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, that is, 𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6) is a concave function of 𝑤6. Similarly, from (4), 
we get
𝑑?̅?62
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚62 + 𝑤6) + 𝛾(𝑚61 + 𝑤6) − (𝛽 − 𝛾) (𝑤6 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
)  and 
𝑑2?̅?62
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0 , 
that is, ?̅?62
𝑚 (𝑤6) is a concave function of 𝑤6. From 
𝑑𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
=
𝑑?̅?62
𝑚 (𝑤6)
𝑑𝑤6
= 0, we get 𝑝61 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
2
−
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛽+𝛾
+
𝑝62 . Replace 𝑤6
∗  and 𝑝62  to (5), we get that
𝑑𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61,𝑝62)
𝑑𝑤6
=
𝑑𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝62)
𝑑𝑝62
=
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)−(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(𝑐1−5𝑐2+16𝑝62)−𝛾(7𝑐1−3𝑐2−16𝑝62)]
2(𝛽+𝛾)
 and 
𝑑2𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝62)
𝑑𝑝62
2 = −8(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, that is, 𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝62) is a concave 
function of 𝑝62 . Let 
𝑑𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61,𝑝62)
𝑑𝑝62
= 0 , we get 𝑝62
∗ =
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)−(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(𝑐1−5𝑐2)−𝛾(7𝑐1−3𝑐2)]
16(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Then, 𝑝61
∗ =
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(7𝑐1−3𝑐2)−𝛾(𝑐1−5𝑐2)]
16(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝61
∗  and 𝑝62
∗  to 𝑤6
∗, we get 𝑤6
∗ =
4𝛼+3(3𝑐1+𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)
16(𝛽−𝛾)
.  
    (7) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 7. From (3), we get 
𝑑?̅?71
𝑚 (𝑤71)
𝑑𝑤71
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚71 + 𝑤71) + 𝛾(𝑚72 + 𝑤72) −
𝛽 (𝑤71 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?71
𝑚 (𝑤71)
𝑑𝑤71
2 = −2𝛽 < 0, that is, ?̅?71
𝑚 (𝑤71) is a concave function of 𝑤71. Let 
𝑑?̅?71
𝑚 (𝑤71)
𝑑𝑤71
= 0, 
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we get 𝑤71
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝71+𝛾𝑝72
𝛽
+
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
. Similarly, from (2), we get 
𝑑𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72)
𝑑𝑤72
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚72 + 𝑤72) + 𝛾(𝑚71 +
𝑤71) − 𝛽(𝑤72 − 𝑐2)  and 
𝑑2𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72)
𝑑𝑤72
2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , that is, 𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72)  is a concave function of 𝑤72 . Let 
𝑑𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72)
𝑑𝑤72
= 0, we get 𝑤72
∗ =
𝛼−𝛽𝑝72+𝛾𝑝71
𝛽
+ 𝑐2. Replace 𝑤71
∗  and 𝑤72
∗  to (5), we get 
𝜕𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71
=
1
2𝛽
[2𝛼(3𝛽 −
2𝛾) + 𝛽2𝑐1 + (𝛽
2 − 2𝛽𝛾)𝑐2 + 12𝛽𝛾𝑝72 − 4(2𝛽
2 + 𝛾2)𝑝71] , 
𝜕𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72
=
1
2𝛽
[2𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾) − 𝛽𝛾𝑐1 +
(2𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛾)𝑐2 + 12𝛽𝛾𝑝71 − 4(2𝛽
2 + 𝛾2)𝑝72] , 
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
< 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72
2 = −4𝛽 −
2𝛾2
𝛽
 and 
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71𝜕𝑝72
=
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72𝜕𝑝71
= 6𝛾. Then |
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71
2
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71𝜕𝑝72
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72𝜕𝑝71
𝜕2𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72
2
| =
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)(𝛽2−𝛾2)
𝛽2
> 0, that is, 𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71, 𝑝72) 
is a joint concave function of 𝑝71  and 𝑝72 . From 
𝜕𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝71
=
𝜕𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71,𝑝72)
𝜕𝑝72
= 0 , we get 𝑝71
∗ =
𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽3−𝛽2𝛾)𝑐1+(𝛽
3−𝛽𝛾2)𝑐2
2(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)
 and 𝑝72
∗ =
2𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1+(4𝛽
3−3𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2)𝑐1
4(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽+𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝71
∗  
and 𝑝72
∗  to 𝑤71
∗  and 𝑤72
∗ , we get 𝑤71
∗ =
2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(6𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐1+(6𝛽
2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐2
16𝛽2−4𝛾2
 and 𝑤72
∗ =
2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(12𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−2𝛾2)𝑐2+𝛽𝛾𝑐1
16𝛽2−4𝛾2
.  
    (8) Retailer’s negotiation strategy 8. From (3), we get 
𝑑?̅?81
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚81 + 𝑤8) + 𝛾(𝑚82 + 𝑤8) − (𝛽 −
𝛾) (𝑤8 −
𝑐1+𝑐2
2
) and 
𝑑2?̅?81
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, so ?̅?81
𝑚 (𝑤8) is a concave function of 𝑤8. Similarly, from (2), 
we get 
𝑑𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑚82 + 𝑤8) + 𝛾(𝑚81 + 𝑤8) − (𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑤8 − 𝑐2) and 
𝑑2𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
2 = −2(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, so 
𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8) is a concave function of 𝑤8 . From 
𝑑?̅?81
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
=
𝑑𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8)
𝑑𝑤8
= 0, we get 𝑝81 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
2
−
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛽+𝛾
+ 𝑝82 . 
Replace 𝑤8
∗  and 𝑝82  to (5), we get 
𝑑𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81,𝑝82)
𝑑𝑝82
=
𝑑𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝82)
𝑑𝑝82
=
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)−(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(3𝑐1−7𝑐2+16𝑝82)−𝛾(5𝑐1+𝑐2+16𝑝82)]
2(𝛽+𝛾)
 
and 
𝑑2𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝82)
𝑑𝑝82
2 = −8(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0, so ?̅?8
𝑟(𝑝81, 𝑝82) is a concave function of 𝑝82. Let 
𝑑𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81,𝑝82)
𝑑𝑝82
= 0, we get 
𝑝82
∗ =
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)−(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(3𝑐1−7𝑐2)−𝛾(5𝑐1−𝑐2)]
16(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝82
∗  to 𝑝81 , we get 𝑝81
∗ =
12𝛼(𝛽+𝛾)+(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(5𝑐1−𝑐2)−𝛾(3𝑐1−7𝑐2)]
16(𝛽+𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Replace 𝑝81
∗  and 𝑝82
∗  to 𝑤8
∗, we get 𝑤8
∗ =
4𝛼+3(𝑐1+3𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)
16(𝛽−𝛾)
.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Case 1: When both manufacturers share their cost information, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11
∗ , 𝑝12
∗ ) =
 24 
 
2𝛼𝛽(2𝛽+𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]+𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)[(2𝛽
2−𝛾2)(𝑐1
2+𝑐2
2)−2𝛽𝛾𝑐1𝑐2]
4(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Similarly, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) =
𝛼2
2(𝛽−𝛾)
−
3𝛼(𝑐1+𝑐2)
8
−
(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(7𝑐1
2−18𝑐1𝑐2+7𝑐2
2)−𝛾(9𝑐1
2−14𝑐1𝑐2+9𝑐2
2)]
16(𝛽+𝛾)
.  
Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2, from table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1, then 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) − 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11
∗ , 𝑝12
∗ ) =
1
16(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
[2𝛼(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 + 𝛾)[4𝛼 − (2𝛽 − 3𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)] − 36𝛽
4(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)
2 + 8𝛽3𝛾(7𝑐1
2 − 15𝑐1𝑐2 +
7c22) + 𝛽2𝛾2(−25𝑐1
2 + 46𝑐1𝑐2 − 25𝑐2
2) − 4𝛽𝛾3(3𝑐1
2 − 8𝑐1𝑐2 + 3𝑐2
2) + 𝛾4(9𝑐1
2 − 14𝑐1𝑐2 + 9𝑐2
2)] >
1
16(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
[(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 + 𝛾)[(8𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (8𝛽 − 5𝛾)𝑐1][(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − 36𝛽
4(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)
2 +
8𝛽3𝛾(7𝑐1
2 − 15𝑐1𝑐2 + 7c2
2) + 𝛽2𝛾2(−25𝑐1
2 + 46𝑐1𝑐2 − 25𝑐2
2) − 4𝛽𝛾3(3𝑐1
2 − 8𝑐1𝑐2 + 3𝑐2
2) + 𝛾4(9𝑐1
2 −
14𝑐1𝑐2 + 9𝑐2
2)] =
1
16(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
[(44𝛽4 + 98𝛽3𝛾 − 84𝛽2𝛾2 − 24𝛽𝛾3 + 18𝛾4)𝑐2
2 + (12𝛽4 + 82𝛽3𝛾 −
60𝛽2𝛾2 − 20𝛽𝛾3 + 14𝛾4)𝑐1
2 − (56𝛽4 + 180𝛽3𝛾 − 144𝛽2𝛾2 − 44𝛽𝛾3 + 32𝛾4)𝑐1𝑐2]. 
Set 𝐴1 = 44𝛽
4 + 98𝛽3𝛾 − 84𝛽2𝛾2 − 24𝛽𝛾3 + 18𝛾4  and 𝐵1 = 12𝛽
4 + 82𝛽3𝛾 − 60𝛽2𝛾2 − 20𝛽𝛾3 + 14𝛾4 , 
then 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) − 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11
∗ , 𝑝12
∗ ) >
1
16(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
[𝐴1𝑐2
2 + 𝐵1𝑐1
2 − (𝐴1 + 𝐵1)𝑐1𝑐2] =
1
16(2𝛽+𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
[(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(𝐴1𝑐2 − 𝐵1𝑐1)] . Since 𝐴1 = (44𝛽
4 − 24𝛽𝛾3) + (98𝛽3𝛾 − 84𝛽2𝛾2) + 18𝛾4 >
0 and 𝐵1 = 12𝛽
4 + (60𝛽3𝛾 − 60𝛽2𝛾2) + (20𝛽3𝛾 − 20𝛽𝛾3) + 14𝛾4 > 0 , then 𝐴1 − 𝐵1 = (32𝛽
4 −
24𝛽2𝛾2) + (16𝛽3𝛾 − 4𝛽𝛾3) + 4𝛾4 > 0 , that is, 𝐴1 > 𝐵1 . So, (𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(𝐴1𝑐2 − 𝐵1𝑐1) > 0 , that is, 
𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) > 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑝11
∗ , 𝑝12
∗ ). Hence, when both manufacturers share their cost information, the retailer will adopt 
unified negotiation strategy.  
Case 2: When both manufacturers hide their cost information, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
2
8(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
. Similarly, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋4
𝑟(𝑝41
∗ , 𝑝42
∗ ) =
[2𝑎−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
2
16(𝛽−𝛾)
. Then 
𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) − 𝜋4
𝑟(𝑝41
∗ , 𝑝42
∗ ) =
[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
2𝛾
16(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, that is, 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) > 𝜋4
𝑟(𝑝41
∗ , 𝑝42
∗ ). Hence, when both 
manufacturers withhold their cost information, the retailer will adopt segmented negotiation strategy. 
Case 3: When only manufacturer 1 sharing his cost information, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) =
𝛽{4𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)[2𝛼−(3𝑐1+𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]+(𝛽−𝛾)[2𝛽
2(5𝑐1
2+2𝑐1𝑐2+𝑐2
2)−4𝛽𝛾𝑐1(𝑐1+𝑐2)−𝛾
2(5𝑐1
2+2𝑐1𝑐2+𝑐2
2)]}
16(𝛽−𝛾)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
. Similarly, from table 2 and 
(5), we get 𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61
∗ , 𝑝62
∗ ) =
𝛼[2𝛼−(3𝑐1+𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
8(𝛽−𝛾)
+
(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(𝑐1
2+22𝑐1𝑐2−7𝑐2
2)+𝛾(17𝑐1
2−10𝑐1𝑐2+9𝑐2
2)]
64(𝛽+𝛾)
. 𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61
∗ , 𝑝62
∗ ) > 0 
means that 8𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾)[2𝛼 − (3𝑐1 + 𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)] > −(𝛽 − 𝛾)
2[𝛽(𝑐1
2 + 22𝑐1𝑐2 − 7𝑐2
2) + 𝛾(17𝑐1
2 − 10𝑐1𝑐2 +
9𝑐2
2)] . Then 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) − 𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61
∗ , 𝑝62
∗ ) =
1
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{8𝛼𝛾(𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)[2𝛼 − (3𝑐1 + 𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)] +
(36𝛽5 − 92𝛽4𝛾 + 81𝛽3𝛾2 − 13𝛽2𝛾3 − 21𝛽𝛾4 + 9𝛾5)𝑐2
2 + (36𝛽5 − 76𝛽4𝛾 + 73𝛽3𝛾2 − 37𝛽2𝛾3 − 13𝛽𝛾4 +
 25 
 
17𝛾5)𝑐1
2 − (72𝛽5 − 200𝛽4𝛾 + 170𝛽3𝛾2 − 2𝛽2𝛾3 − 50𝛽𝛾4 + 10𝛾5)𝑐1𝑐2} >
1
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{−𝛾(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 −
𝛾)2[𝛽(𝑐1
2 + 22𝑐1𝑐2 − 7𝑐2
2) + 𝛾(17𝑐1
2 − 10𝑐1𝑐2 + 9𝑐2
2)] + (36𝛽5 − 92𝛽4𝛾 + 81𝛽3𝛾2 − 13𝛽2𝛾3 − 21𝛽𝛾4 +
9𝛾5)𝑐2
2 + (36𝛽5 − 76𝛽4𝛾 + 73𝛽3𝛾2 − 37𝛽2𝛾3 − 13𝛽𝛾4 + 17𝛾5)𝑐1
2 − (72𝛽5 − 200𝛽4𝛾 + 170𝛽3𝛾2 − 2𝛽2𝛾3 −
50𝛽𝛾4 + 10𝛾5)𝑐1𝑐2} =
(34𝛽3−6𝛽2𝛾−6𝛽𝛾2)(𝛽−𝛾)2+8𝛽𝛾3(𝛽−𝛾)
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2 > 0 , that is, 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) > 𝜋6
𝑟(𝑝61
∗ , 𝑝62
∗ ) . 
Hence, when only manufacturer 1 sharing his cost information, the retailer will adopt segmented negotiation 
strategy. 
Case 4: When only manufacturer 2 sharing his cost information, from table 2 and (5), we get 𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ) =
𝛽{4𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)[2𝛼−(𝑐1+3𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]+(𝛽−𝛾)[2𝛽
2(5𝑐1
2+2𝑐1𝑐2+𝑐2
2)−4𝛽𝛾𝑐2(𝑐1+𝑐2)−𝛾
2(𝑐1
2+2𝑐1𝑐2+5𝑐2
2)]}
16(𝛽−𝛾)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
. Similarly, from table 2 and 
(5), we get 𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81
∗ , 𝑝82
∗ ) =
𝛼[2𝛼−(𝑐1+3𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
8(𝛽−𝛾)
−
(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛽(7𝑐1
2−22𝑐1𝑐2−𝑐2
2)−𝛾(9𝑐1
2−10𝑐1𝑐2+17𝑐2
2)]
64(𝛽+𝛾)
. 𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81
∗ , 𝑝82
∗ ) > 0 
means that 8𝛼(𝛽 + 𝛾)[2𝛼 − (𝑐1 + 3𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)] > (𝛽 − 𝛾)
2[𝛽(7𝑐1
2 − 22𝑐1𝑐2 − 𝑐2
2) − 𝛾(9𝑐1
2 − 10𝑐1𝑐2 + 17𝑐2
2)]. 
Then we get 𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ) − 𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81
∗ , 𝑝82
∗ ) =
1
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{8𝛼𝛾(𝛽 + 𝛾)(2𝛽 + 𝛾)[2𝛼 − (𝑐1 + 3𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)] +
(36𝛽5 − 76𝛽4𝛾 + 73𝛽3𝛾2 − 37𝛽2𝛾3 − 13𝛽𝛾4 + 17𝛾5)𝑐2
2 + (36𝛽5 − 92𝛽4𝛾 + 81𝛽3𝛾2 − 13𝛽2𝛾3 − 21𝛽𝛾4 +
9𝛾5)𝑐1
2 − (72𝛽5 − 200𝛽4𝛾 + 170𝛽3𝛾2 − 2𝛽2𝛾3 − 50𝛽𝛾4 + 10𝛾5)𝑐1𝑐2} >
1
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{𝛾(2𝛽 + 𝛾)(𝛽 −
𝛾)2[𝛽(7𝑐1
2 − 22𝑐1𝑐2 − 𝑐2
2) − 𝛾(9𝑐1
2 − 10𝑐1𝑐2 + 17𝑐2
2)] + (36𝛽5 − 76𝛽4𝛾 + 73𝛽3𝛾2 − 37𝛽2𝛾3 − 13𝛽𝛾4 +
17𝛾5)𝑐2
2 + (36𝛽5 − 92𝛽4𝛾 + 81𝛽3𝛾2 − 13𝛽2𝛾3 − 21𝛽𝛾4 + 9𝛾5)𝑐1
2 − (72𝛽5 − 200𝛽4𝛾 + 170𝛽3𝛾2 − 2𝛽2𝛾3 −
50𝛽𝛾4 + 10𝛾5)𝑐1𝑐2} =
1
64(𝛽2−𝛾2)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
(36𝛽5 − 78𝛽4𝛾 + 42𝛽3𝛾2 + 14𝛽2𝛾3 − 14𝛽𝛾4)(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2 > 0 , that is, 
𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ) > 𝜋8
𝑟(𝑝81
∗ , 𝑝82
∗ ). Hence, when only manufacturer 2 sharing his cost information, the retailer will 
adopt segmented negotiation strategy. So, when both manufacturers share their cost information, the retailer will 
adopt unified negotiation strategy; otherwise, the retailer will adopt segmented negotiation strategy.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2 , from table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 . Then 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) − 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) =
1
16(𝛽+𝛾)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[16𝛼2𝛽2 + 24𝛼2𝛽𝛾 + 8𝛼2𝛾2 + (−30𝛽4 + 62𝛽3𝛾 − 28𝛽2𝛾2 − 15𝛽𝛾3 + 9𝛾4)𝑐2
2 + (−38𝛽4 +
58𝛽3𝛾 − 20𝛽2𝛾2 − 11𝛽𝛾3 + 9𝛾4)𝑐1
2 − (−68𝛽4 + 128𝛽3𝛾 − 44𝛽2𝛾2 − 34𝛽𝛾3 + 14𝛾4)𝑐1𝑐2 + 𝛼(−16𝛽
3 −
12𝛽2𝛾 + 10𝛽𝛾2 + 6𝛾3)𝑐2 + 𝛼(12𝛽
2𝛾 + 18𝛽𝛾2 + 6𝛾3)𝑐1] >
1
16(𝛽+𝛾)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1](12𝛽
3 +
12𝛽2𝛾 + 5𝛽𝛾2 − 3𝛾3)𝑐2 − [(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1](12𝛽
3 + 8𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2 − 5𝛾3)𝑐1 + (−30𝛽
4 + 62𝛽3𝛾 −
28𝛽2𝛾2 − 15𝛽𝛾3 + 9𝛾4)𝑐2
2 + (−38𝛽4 + 58𝛽3𝛾 − 20𝛽2𝛾2 − 11𝛽𝛾3 + 9𝛾4)𝑐1
2 − (−68𝛽4 + 128𝛽3𝛾 − 44𝛽2𝛾2 −
34𝛽𝛾3 + 14𝛾4)𝑐1𝑐2} =
𝑐2−𝑐1
16(𝛽+𝛾)(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[(30𝛽4 + 86𝛽3𝛾 − 79𝛽2𝛾2 − 21𝛽𝛾3 + 18𝛾4)𝑐2 − (−2𝛽
4 + 70𝛽3𝛾 −
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55𝛽2𝛾2 − 17𝛽𝛾3 + 14𝛾4)𝑐1] > 0, that is, 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) > 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ). 
𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) − 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)[4𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−2𝛽
2(3𝑐1+𝑐2)+2𝛽𝛾(𝑐1+𝑐2)+𝛾
2(3𝑐1+𝑐2)]
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
>
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1){2(2𝛽+𝛾)[(5𝛽−3𝛾)𝑐2−(3𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1]+(𝛾
2−2𝛽2)(3𝑐1+𝑐2)+2𝛽𝛾(𝑐1+𝑐2)}
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
=
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2(18𝛽2−5𝛾2)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) >
𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ).  
𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) − 𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)[4𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−2𝛽
2(𝑐1+3𝑐2)+2𝛽𝛾(𝑐1+𝑐2)+𝛾
2(𝑐1+3𝑐2)]
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
>
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1){(4𝛽+2𝛾)[(5𝛽−3𝛾)𝑐2−(3𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1]+(𝛾
2−2𝛽2)(𝑐1+3𝑐2)+2𝛽𝛾(𝑐1+𝑐2)}
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
=
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2(14𝛽2−3𝛾2)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) −
𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ). So, 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ) > 𝜋5
𝑟(𝑝51
∗ , 𝑝52
∗ ) > 𝜋3
𝑟(𝑝31
∗ , 𝑝32
∗ ) > 𝜋7
𝑟(𝑝71
∗ , 𝑝72
∗ ).  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2, from table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1. 
𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤21
∗ ) − 𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) =
1
64(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)2
{(48𝛽4 − 136𝛽3𝛾 + 133𝛽2𝛾2 − 50𝛽𝛾3 + 5𝛾4)𝑐2
2 + (80𝛽4 − 248𝛽3𝛾 +
281𝛽2𝛾2 − 138𝛽𝛾3 + 25𝛾4)𝑐1
2 − (128𝛽4 − 384𝛽3𝛾 + 414𝛽2𝛾2 − 188𝛽𝛾3 + 30𝛾4)𝑐1𝑐2 + 4𝛾
2[(𝛼2 + (𝛽 −
𝛾)2𝑐2
2] + 4𝛼(𝛽 − 𝛾)[(8𝛽2 − 12𝛽𝛾 + 3𝛾2)𝑐2 − (8𝛽
2 − 12𝛽𝛾 + 5𝛾2)𝑐1]} >
1
64(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)2
[(128𝛽4 − 384𝛽3𝛾 +
432𝛽2𝛾2 − 208𝛽𝛾3 + 36𝛾4)𝑐2
2 + (128𝛽4 − 384𝛽3𝛾 + 432𝛽2𝛾2 − 208𝛽𝛾3 + 36𝛾4)𝑐1
2 − 2(128𝛽4 − 384𝛽3𝛾 +
432𝛽2𝛾2 − 208𝛽𝛾3 + 36𝛾4)𝑐1𝑐2] =
1
64(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)2
(128𝛽4 − 384𝛽3𝛾 + 432𝛽2𝛾2 − 208𝛽𝛾3 + 36𝛾4)(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)
2 >
0, that is, 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤21
∗ ) > 𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ). 
𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) − 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
[8𝛼𝛽2(2𝛽 + 𝛾) − 4𝛽4(𝑐1 + 3𝑐2) + 4𝛽
3𝛾(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) + 8𝛽
2𝛾2𝑐2 + 𝛾
4(𝑐1 −
𝑐2)] >
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
{4𝛽2(2𝛽 + 𝛾)[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − 4𝛽
4(𝑐1 + 3𝑐2) + 4𝛽
3𝛾(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) + 8𝛽
2𝛾2𝑐2 +
𝛾4(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)} =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
(28𝛽4 − 4𝛽2𝛾2 − 𝛾4)(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > 0 , that is, 𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) > 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ). So, 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤21
∗ ) >
𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) > 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ).  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Set 𝑓(𝛼) = 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) − 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ) , then 𝑓(𝛼) =
[2𝛼+(𝛽−𝛾)(3𝑐1−5𝑐2)]
2
64(𝛽−𝛾)
−
𝛽[2𝛼+(3𝛾−5𝛽)𝑐2+(3𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1][2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
16(2𝛽−𝛾)2
. So 
𝑑𝑓(𝛼)
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛾2𝛼+(8𝛽3−20𝛽2𝛾+15𝛽𝛾2−3𝛾3)𝑐1−(8𝛽
3−20𝛽2𝛾+17𝛽𝛾2−5𝛾3)𝑐2
16(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)2
 and 
𝑑2𝑓(𝛼)
𝑑𝛼2
=
𝛾2
8(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , that is, 𝑓(𝛼)  is convex function of 𝛼 . Let 
𝑑𝑓(𝛼)
𝑑𝛼
= 0 , we get 𝛼0 =
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(𝛽−𝛾)[(8𝛽2−12𝛽𝛾+5𝛾2)𝑐2−(8𝛽
2−12𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑐1]
2𝛾2
. Then, 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓(𝛼) = 𝑓(𝛼0) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛾−𝛽)
4𝛾2
.  
If 𝛾 < 𝛽 < 2𝛾 , then 𝑓(𝛼) > 𝑓(𝛼0) > 0 , that is, 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) > 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ) . If 𝛽 > 2𝛾 , then 𝑓(𝛼0) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
2(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛾−𝛽)
4𝛾2
< 0 . Since 𝑓(0) =  
(𝛽−𝛾)[(80𝛽2−88𝛽𝛾+25𝛾2)𝑐2
2+(48𝛽2−40𝛽𝛾+9𝛾2)𝑐1
2−(128𝛽2−128𝛽𝛾+30𝛾2)𝑐1𝑐2
64(2𝛽−𝛾)2
>
0, then there are two positive solutions for 𝑓(𝛼) = 0. Set the two position solutions are 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, and 𝛼1 >
𝛼2 > 0 , we get 𝛼1 =
(𝛽−𝛾)[(8𝛽2−12𝛽𝛾+5𝛾2)𝑐2−(8𝛽
2−12𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑐1]
2𝛾2
+
4(𝑐2−𝑐1)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽−2𝛾)
2𝛾2
 and 𝛼2 =
(𝛽−𝛾)[(8𝛽2−12𝛽𝛾+5𝛾2)𝑐2−(8𝛽
2−12𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑐1]
2𝛾2
−
4(𝑐2−𝑐1)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽−2𝛾)
2𝛾2
. Then, if 𝛼 > 𝛼1  or 𝛼 < 𝛼2 , then 
𝑓(𝛼) > 0, that is, 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) > 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ )；if 𝛼2 < 𝛼 < 𝛼1 , then 𝑓(𝛼) < 0, that is, 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) < 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ). 
Hence, if 𝛾 < 𝛽 < 2𝛾, or 𝛽 > 2𝛾 and 𝛼 > 𝛼1 or 𝛼 < 𝛼2, then 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) > 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ )；if 𝛽 > 2𝛾 and 𝛼2 <
𝛼 < 𝛼1, then 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤22
∗ ) < 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ).  
If 𝛽 > 2𝛾, then ∆𝛼 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼2 =
4(𝑐2−𝑐1)(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽−2𝛾)
𝛾2
. So 
𝑑∆𝛼
𝑑𝛽
=
4(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛾2
[2(𝛽 − 𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽 − 2𝛾) +
(2𝛽 − 𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽 − 2𝛾) +
(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)2
√𝛽(𝛽−2𝛾)
] > 0 , that is, ∆𝛼  increases in 𝛽 . Similarly, 
𝑑∆𝛼
𝑑𝛾
= −
4(𝑐2−𝑐1)
𝛾4
{𝛾2 [(𝛽 −
𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽 − 2𝛾) + (2𝛽 − 𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽 − 2𝛾) + (2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
𝛽
√𝛽(𝛽−2𝛾)
] + 2𝛾(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)√𝛽(𝛽 − 2𝛾)} < 0 , 
then ∆𝛼 decreases in 𝛾. So, if 𝛽 > 2𝛾, then ∆𝛼 increases in 𝛽 and decreases in 𝛾. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
(1) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 1, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11
∗ ) =
𝛽[𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(2𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐1+𝛽𝛾𝑐2]
2
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. 
Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12
∗ ) =
𝛽[𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(2𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑐2+𝛽𝛾𝑐1]
2
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. Then 𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11
∗ ) − 𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝛽+𝛾)(𝑐2−𝑐1)[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
4(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝜋11
𝑚 (𝑤11
∗ ) > 𝜋12
𝑚 (𝑤12
∗ ).  
(2) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 2, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗) =
[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(5𝑐1−3𝑐2)]
2
64(𝛽−𝛾)
. 
Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗) =
[2𝛼+(𝛽−𝛾)(3𝑐1−5𝑐2)]
2
64(𝛽−𝛾)
. Then 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗) − 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗) =
1
4
(𝑐2 −
𝑐1)[2𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)] > 0, that is, 𝜋21
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗) > 𝜋22
𝑚 (𝑤2
∗).  
(3) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 3, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼+(3𝛾−5𝛽)𝑐1+(3𝛽−𝛾)𝑐2][2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
16(2𝛽−𝛾)2
. Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼+(3𝛾−5𝛽)𝑐2+(3𝛽−𝛾)𝑐1][2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
16(2𝛽−𝛾)2
. Then 𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) − 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
4(2𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , that is, 
𝜋31
𝑚 (𝑤31
∗ ) > 𝜋32
𝑚 (𝑤32
∗ ).  
 28 
 
(4) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 4, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋41
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗) =
[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(5𝑐1−3𝑐2)][2𝑎−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
64(𝛽−𝛾)
. Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋42
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗) =
[2𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(5𝑐2−3𝑐1)][2𝑎−(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐1+𝑐2)]
64(𝛽−𝛾)
. Then 𝜋41
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗) − 𝜋42
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗) =
1
8
(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)[2𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)] > 0, that is, 
𝜋41
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗) > 𝜋42
𝑚 (𝑤4
∗).  
(5) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 5, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+𝛽𝛾𝑐2−(4𝛽
2−𝛽𝛾−2𝛾2)𝑐1]
2
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋52
𝑚 (𝑤52
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(2𝛽2−2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐2−(2𝛽
2−𝛾2)𝑐1][2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(10𝛽
2−3𝛾2)𝑐2+(6𝛽
2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐1]
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2, from table 2, we 
get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 , then 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ) − 𝜋52
𝑚 (𝑤52
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[2𝛼(6𝛽 + 4𝛾) − (5𝛽2 −
3𝛾2)𝑐2 − (7𝛽
2 − 4𝛽𝛾 − 5𝛾2)𝑐1] >
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[(6𝛽 + 4𝛾)[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − (5𝛽
2 − 3𝛾2)𝑐2 −
(7𝛽2 − 4𝛽𝛾 − 5𝛾2)𝑐1] =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[(25𝛽2 + 2𝛽𝛾 − 9𝛾2)(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)] > 0, that is, 𝜋51
𝑚 (𝑤51
∗ ) > 𝜋52
𝑚 (𝑤52
∗ ).  
(6) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 6, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗) =
[4𝛼−(7𝑐1−3𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
2
256(𝛽−𝛾)
. 
Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋62
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗) =
[4𝛼+(9𝑐1−13𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)][4𝛼+(𝑐1−5𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
256(𝛽−𝛾)
. Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2, from 
table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 , then 𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗) − 𝜋62
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗) =
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
[12𝛼 − (5𝑐1 + 7𝑐2)(𝛽 −
𝛾)] >
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
{6[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − (5𝑐1 + 7𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)} =
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
(23𝛽 − 11𝛾) > 0 , that is, 
𝜋61
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗) > 𝜋62
𝑚 (𝑤6
∗).  
(7) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 7, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋71
𝑚 (𝑤71
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(2𝛽2−2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐2−(2𝛽
2−𝛾2)𝑐1][2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)−(10𝛽
2−3𝛾2)𝑐1+(6𝛽
2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐2]
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we 
get 𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72
∗ ) =
𝛽[2𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+𝛽𝛾𝑐1−(4𝛽
2−𝛽𝛾−2𝛾2)𝑐1]
2
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)2
. Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2, from table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 −
(3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 , then 𝜋71
𝑚 (𝑤71
∗ ) − 𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72
∗ ) =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
[2𝛼(6𝛽 + 4𝛾) − (5𝛽2 − 3𝛾2)𝑐1 − (7𝛽
2 − 4𝛽𝛾 −
5𝛾2)𝑐2] >
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
{(6𝛽 + 4𝛾)[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − (5𝛽
2 − 3𝛾2)𝑐1 − (7𝛽
2 − 4𝛽𝛾 − 5𝛾2)𝑐2} =
𝛽(𝑐2−𝑐1)
16(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
(23𝛽2 + 6𝛽𝛾 − 7𝛾2)(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > 0, that is, 𝜋71
𝑚 (𝑤71
∗ ) > 𝜋72
𝑚 (𝑤72
∗ ).  
(8) With retailer’s negotiation strategy 8, from table 2 and (1), we get 𝜋81
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗) =
[4𝛼−(13𝑐1−9𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)][4𝛼−(5𝑐1−𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
256(𝛽−𝛾)
. Similarly, from table 2 and (2), we get 𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗) =
[4𝛼+(3𝑐1−7𝑐2)(𝛽−𝛾)]
2
256(𝛽−𝛾)
. 
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Since 𝑤32
∗ > 𝑐2 , from table 2, we get 2𝛼 > (5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1 , then 𝜋81
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗) − 𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗) =
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
[12𝛼 − (7𝑐1 + 5𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)] >
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
{6[(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐2 − (3𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐1] − (7𝑐1 + 5𝑐2)(𝛽 − 𝛾)} =
𝑐2−𝑐1
32
(25𝛽 − 13𝛾)(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > 0, that is, 𝜋81
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗) > 𝜋82
𝑚 (𝑤8
∗).  
So, the high-efficiency manufacturer’s maximum profit is always higher than that of the low-efficiency 
manufacturer.  
